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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
priate and proper way to ascertain the value of the thing at the time, and
if, as appeared, there was no market price for warps at that time and
that they were an article not usually sold at auction, it does not lie with
the defendants to complain; for, having had ample notice of the sale, they
might have attended it and protected themselves by buying the warps
if the price they brought was below their value.
The report of the referee should be affirmed.
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ATTORNEY.
Disbarment- Causes for.-An act highly discreditable but not in-
famous and not connected with an attorney's duties, will not give the
court jurisdiction to strike him from the roll: Dickens' Case, 67 Pa.
An attempt to make an opposing attorney drunk to obtain an advan-
tage of him in the trial of a cause, is good ground for striking an attor-
ney from the roll: Id.
AGENT. See Usury.
Payment to Agent.-It is well settled that a debtor is authorized to
pay an agent any sum which is due upon a security which has been in-
trusted to the agent by the holder, for the purpose of collecting any part
of it; as where the agent has been authorized to receive the interest only,
but receives the principal: Doubleday v. Kress, 60 Barb.
Indeed the authorities go to the extent of holding a payment valid,
made to an agent who is merely intrusted with the possession of the
security, without express authority to receive or collect any part of it.
The ostensible authority attributed to a party to whom is intrusted an
instrument to secure the payment of money, is to receive payment accord-
ing to its terms. Per TALCOTT, J. : .Id.
The principal is, as to third persons not having any notice of a limi-
tation, bound by the ostensible authority of the agent, and cannot avail
himself of secret limitations upon the authority and repudiate the agency,
1 From J. Win. Wallace, Esq., Reporter; to appear in vol. 12 of his Reports.
2 From Hon. N. L. Freeman, Reporter; to appear in.54 Ills. Reports.
3 From C. E. Green, Esq. ; to appear in vol. 7 of his Reports.
4 From Hon. 0. L. Barbour; to appear in vol. 60 of his Reports.
5 From P. F. Smith, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 67 Penna. State Reports.
6 From W. G. Veazey, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 43 Vt. Reports.
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where innocent third persons have in good faith acted upon the ostensi-
ble authority conferred by the principal: .1d.
The plaintiff held a note for $800 and interest, payable to her own
order at the office of W., made by the defendant. When it fell due, the
plaintiff, without endorsing the note, handed it to M. to present for pay-
ment. M. accordingly presented the note at the place of payment,
together with a forged order upon W., purporting to be signed by the
plaintiff, requesting W. to pay her money to M. The principal and
interest was thereupon paid by W., and the note delivered up and can-
celled, and M. absconded with the money. Held that the payment was
clearly valid both upon authority and principle, and discharged the
note: Id.
BANKRUPTCY. See Replevin.
Insolvency.-Preference to Creditor in Fraud of Bankrupt Act.-By
insolvency, as used in the Bankrupt Act when applied to traders and
merchants, is meant inability of a party to pay his debts as they become
due in the ordinary course of business: Toof et al. v. artin, Assignee,
&c., 12 Wall.
The transfer by a debtor of a large portion of his property while he
is insolvent to one creditor, without making provision for an equal dis-
tribution of its proceeds to all his creditors, necessarily operates as a
preference to him, and must be taken as conclusive evidence that a
preference was intended, unless the debtor can show that he was at the
time ignorant of his insolvency, and that his affairs were such that he
could reasonably expect to pay all his debts. The burden of proof is
upon him in such a case, and not upon the assignee or contestant in
bankruptcy: Id.
A creditor has reasonable cause to believe a debtor, who is a trader, to
be insolvent when such a state of facts is brought to the creditor's notice
respecting the affairs and pecuniary condition of the debtor as would lead
a prudent business man to the conclusion that he is unable to meet his
obligations as they mature in the ordinary course of business : 1d.
A transfer by an insolvent debtor with a view to secure his property,
or any part of it, to one creditor, and thus prevent an equal distribution
among all his creditors, is a transfer in fraud of the Bankrupt Act: Id.
BILLS AND NOTES.
Fraudulent Aote-Right of BonO fide Bolder.-lloss signed a note
payable to Benton or bearer, which was a fraud on Moss. Phelar
bought it from a holder bond fide for value, and without notice of the
fraud. Held, that he could recover from Moss-: Phelan v. Moss, 67 Pa.
A holder of a negotiable note bond fide for value, without notice, can
recover it, notwithstanding he took it under circumstances which ought
to excite the suspicion of a prudent man: Id.
In order to destroy such holder's title, it must be shown that he took
the note mald fide: Id.
The doctrine as to the title of the holder of a note, fraudulent as
between the original parties, discussed, and the authorities examined in
this case: Id.
Gill v. Cubitt, 3 B. & 0. 466, not law in Pennsylvania; Beltzhoover
v. Blackstock, 3 Watts 20, criticised: Id.
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Fraudulent Alteration not apparent on Face.-Garrard signed a
printed note, in the blank of which was written " one hundred," leav-
ing a blank space between that and "dollars," which was in print; this,
after delivery, was filled with "fifty" in the same hand, and nothing in
the appearance to raise a suspicion that it was not all right. Held, that
Garrard was liable for the face of the note to a bonafide holder for value:
Garrard v. Haddan, 67 Pa.
If the blank had been scored, or the alteration in any way perceptible,
a purchaser would have taken it at his own risk: Id.
If one by his acts, or silence, or negligence, misleads another, or affects
a transaction whereby an innocent party suffers, the blameable party
must bear the loss: Id.
Fraud and Circumvention- What onstitutes.-Where a party signed
a promissory note, and alleged, not that he did not know he was signing
such a note, but merely that, by the terms of an instrument attached to
the note when it was executed, it was only to be paid on a contingency
which did not occur, and that this instrument was wrongfully detached
from the note after its execution : Held, these facts did not constitute
fraud in obtaining the execution of the note, but fraud perpetrated after
its execution, and therefore not availing as a defence against an assignee
before maturity: Elliott v. Levings, 54 Ills.
It is no defence to a promissory note, against an innocent assignee,
that the note, when delivered, was left in blank as to the time of pay-
ment, and this blank was afterwards improperly filled by the payee: Id.
Obtained by lMenace of Arrest, &c.-In order to avoid an act on the
ground of menace of arrest or imprisonment, it must appear that the
menace was of an unlawful inprisonment, and that the party was put in
fear of such imprisonment, and was induced by such fear to do the act
in question : Knapp v. Hyde, 60 Barb.
It is not such menace as will avoid an act, if the party is only menaced
by a lawful imprisonment: Id.
Where the defendant, at the time of making a promissory note, was
not under arrest or imprisonment, but was at his residence in this state,
where he had committed no criminal offence for which he could be
arrested or imprisoned, having made, at most, as was alleged by the
payee, only some fraudulent representations in respect to the value of
land upon which he had a mortgage that he had sold to the payee of the
note; which sale, and the representations that induced it, were made in
the state of Illinois: it was held, that as there was no ground for the
defendant's arrest, in either state, on a criminal charge, or for his being
taken to Illinois in any criminal proceeding for such fraud, a threat of
such an arrest constituted no defence to an action upon the note: Id.
COLLATERAL SECURITY. See Mortgage.
COMION CARRIER.
Diligence-Acts of Public Enerny.-During the civil war the defend-
ant was proprietor of a stage and express line upon the overland route
to California. The stage was attacked by Indians and robbed of its
contents, amongst which was a safe containing money of the plaintiff
below. The judge charged the jury, in determining what was the duty
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of the express agent at that time, to inquire what a cool, self-possessed,
prudent, careful man would have done with his own property under the
same circumstances; that it was the defendantis duty to provide such a
man for this hazardous business. Held, that the charge was not erro-
neous; that it only required of the defendant what might be called
ordinary care and diligence under the special circumstances of the case:
Hlolladay v. Kennard, 12 Wall.
What is ordinary negligence depends on the employment. Where
skill and capacity are required to accomplish an undertaking, it would
be negligence not to employ persons having thase qualifications: Id.
When goods in the hands of a common carrier are threatened to be
destroyed or seized by a public enemy, he is bound to use due diligence
to prevent such destruction or seizure: Id.
It is not necessary that he should be guilty of fraud or collusion with
the enemy, or wilful negligence, to make him liable; ordinary negligence
is sufficient: Id.
Grounds for refusing to receive Goods, if they exist, should be stated
at the Time-Surgical Instruments of Army Siurgeon.-The obligations
and liabilities of a common carrier are not dependent upon contract,
though they may be modified and limited by contract; they are imposed
by the law, from the public nature of his employment: Hannibal Rail-
road v. Swift, 12 Wall.
If a common carrier of passengers and of goods and merchandise,
have reasonable ground for refusing to receive and carry persons apply-
ing for passage, and their baggage and other property, he is bound to
insist at the time upon such grounds if desirous of avoiding responsi-
bility. If not thus insisting he receives the passengers and their \bag-
gage and other property, his liability is the same as though no ground
for refusal existed: Id.
The liability of a common carrier of goods and merchandise attaches
when the property passes, with his assent, into his possession, and is not
affected by the carriage in which it is transported, or the fact that the
carriage is loaded by the owner. The common carrier is an insurer of
the property carried, and upon him the duty rests to see that the pack-
ing and conveyance are such as to secure its safety: Id.
It is not a ground for limiting the responsibility of a common carrier,
where no interference is attempted with his control of the property car-
ried, that the owner of the property accompanies it and keeps watch for
its safety: .d.
Where a railroad company receives for transportation, in cars which
accompany its passenger trains, property of a passenger other than his
baggage, in relation to which no fraud or concealment is practised or
attempted upon its employees, it assumes with reference to the property
the liability of a common carrier of merchandise: Id.
Surgical instruments, in the case of a surgeon in the army travelling
with troops, constitute part of his baggage : Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Taxation on Tonnage.-Although taxes levied as on property by a
state upon vessels owned by its citizens, and based on a valuation of the
same, are not prohibited by the Federal Constitution, yet taxes cannot
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be imposed on them by the state "at so much per ton of the registered
tonnage." Such taxes are within the prohibition that "no state shall,
without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage :" Cox v. The
Collector, 12 Wall.
Nor is the case varied by the fact that the vessels were not only owned
by citizens of the state, but exclusively engaged in trade between places
within the state.: Id.
CURRENCY. See Municipal Corporation.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See Bankruptc $y; Insurance; Replevin.
Preference by Insolvent Debtor-Agreement of Credi(ors to give Time.
-- A number of executions had been issued against Wilson; the plain-
tiffs agreed to stay for four months, and with other creditors (not being
all) agreed to give him time, and "in case of executions issued on any
of said claims it is hereby stipulated that the above-named execution-
creditors shall have priority whatever the order of their being issued."
This meant, that in case of executions being issued on the claims of any
of the signers to the agreement, the executions then issued should have
priority, but as between the executions issued, in case of insufficiency
the fund raised should be distributed pro ratd. The signers were bound
in good faith to carry it out: Loucheim Brothers' Appeal, 67 Pa.
Wilson owed Loucheim $1600, but stated it in the agreement and to
the other creditors at $830; and to induce Loucheim to sign, gave him
a. judgment for $800 as part of the'debt, payable in thirty days. This
was a fraud on the other signers, and Loucheim's judgment as to them
was void: fd.
It was not void as to creditors not signing: Id.
Loucheim having issued execution on his judgment, was trustee ex
maleficio for the signers, in respect to any advantage obtained by it : Id.
McCord, one of the original execution-creditors, and a signer, issued
execution prematurely after Loucheim; there being no proyision for
forfeiture in such case, he also was trustee for the other signers : Id.
Robinson, not one of the signers, issued executlon after McCord; he
had no claim to the fund till after the other two were satisfied: Id.
Loucheim's acts were not a fraud on Robinson : Id.
The fund raised on the executions was to be distributed amongst the
execution-creditors who signed the agreement pro ratti: Id.
Wilcox v. Waln, 10 S. & R. 380; .Manufacturers"and Mechanics' Bank
v. Bank of Pennsflvania,, 7 W. & S. 335, adopted: Id.
a-editor's Bill- Who may maintain it.-A surety who had paid a
judgment recovered against himself and his principal, joined with
other creditors, after the dceath of the principal debtor, in a bill in chan-
cery to set aside a conveyance made by him in his lifetime, for the pur-
pose, as was alleged, of defrauding his creditors : field, such surety
stood in the position of a simple-contract creditor, not having obtained
a judgment against his principal ip his lifetime, or obtained an allow-
ance of the claim against his estate, and therefore was not in a position
to maintain a bill of that character: Mugge v. Ewing et al., 54 Ills.
BASEMENT.
Extent of-Vo Easement-in one's own Land.-A devise of a building
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and lot to A. on condition that he will permit B. "to carry on the busi-
ness of a druggist on that part of the premises then occupied by him
for his business of a druggist (being part of the first floor of said build-
ing) so long as he should desire to use it for that purpose," created no
easements in the adjoining lot, for the use of a hydrant, and for passage
over said lot in favor of B., though he had been allowed these privileges
in the testator's lifetime! Stanford v. .31on and Wife, 7 0. E. Green.
The devise as to B. being only the privilege reserved of carrying on
the druggist's business in the parts occupied by him at testator's death,
is simply the right to occupy: Id.
The owners of lands can have no easement in or over his adjoining
lands, and where-he sells one parcel, the right to enjoy privileges and
conveniences which he, when owner of both, enjoyed in the other, does
not pass to the purchaser: Id.
EXECUTIVE. See Governor.
GOVERNOR.
Subpoena to, as Witness-Production of Official Papers-Court will
presume no Contempt.-Every person, whatever his office or dignity, is
bound to appear and testify in courts of justice when required to do so
by proper process, unless he has a lawful excuse. The dignity of the
office, or the mere fact of official position, is not of itself an excuse,
and whether the official engagements are a sufficient excuse must be
determined from the circumstances of each case : Thonpson v. German
Valley Railroad Co., 7 C. E. Green.
The governor will not be compelled to produce in court any paper or
document in his possession; he will be allowed to withhold it, or any
part of it, if in his opinion his official duty requires him to do so: Id.
The governor cannot be examined as to his reasons for not signing an
Act of the Legislature, nor as to his action in any respect regarding it.
But he is bound to appear and testify as to the time an act was delivered
to him: Id.
But an order to testify is an unusual, if not unheard-of. practice,
and ought not to be made against the Executive, of the state : II.
In the case of the Executive, the court would hardly entertain pro-
ceedings to compel him to testify by adjudging him in contempt. It
will be presumed that the chief magistrate intends no contempt: d.
If the governor, without sufficient or lawful reason, refuses to appear
and testify, he is, like all other citizens, liable to respond in damages to
any narty injured by his refusal : Id.
HIGHWAY.
Damages-Insurance.-A town, liable for damages occasioned by the
insufficiency of a highway, is not entitled to have deducted the amount
received by the plaintiff from an insurance company on account of the
injuries for which he claims to recover against the town: Harding v.
Town of Townshend, 43 Vt.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Wife's Ohattels in possession of Etusband.-Mrs. Davis bought a horse
in West Virginia (where the common law as to husband and wife pre-
vailed), to be paid for from her share of her father's estate in Pennsyl-
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vania. Her note for the purchase-money was taken to the vendor by
her husband, and the horse delivered tW him; being in his possession
in Pennsylvania, it was sold, under an execution against him, to the
creditor; the wife afterwards paid the note from her separate estate.
Held, that the horse had become the property of the husband on its
delivery to him, and was liable to be seized for his debt: Davis et ux.
v. Zignmerman, 67 Pa.
The mere delivery of the horse to the husband for the wife, without
any act or declaration by him, was not a waiver of his marital rights nor
evidence of his assent from which the jury could find it: Id.
The case was to be determined by the rules of the common law: Id.
Separate Property of Wie.-Where a married woman had purchased
a lot of ground with money obtained from a person other than her hus-
band, and a house erected thereon was paid for in the same way, it was
held, upon the facts, that personal property for which the house and lot
were exchanged was the separate property of the wife, although the
transaction was negotiated by her husband, and such personal property
was not subject to levy and sale for his debts: Elder v. Cordray, 54
Ills.
Ante-nuptial *Contrats-Statute of Yrauds-Trover.-In several
Vermont cases the legal title of the wife is recognised in a court of law,
as existing against the effect of coverture, by reason of an understand-
ing between the husband and wife after marriage, rather implied than
expressed, that certain property, which would otherwise belong to the
husband, should remain and be the sole and separate property of the
wife: Child v. Pearl, 43 Vt.
A parol agreement by the husband, made before marriage, that
property belonging to his wife while sole should remain hers, would
operate to prevent the title being divested from her by the operation
of law on the taking place of the marriage; and she being divorced
may obtain trover for it against a purchaser from the husband': 11.
The Statute of Frauds is no shield for the defendant, because the
action is based on a title that was always in the plaintiff, not on an
executory ante-nuptial contract. The agreement became executed and
its effect realized at once upon the fact of marriage, in that the right
of property was not transferred to the husband by such marriage: -d.
INFANT.
Testimony in Chancer.y-B whom to be taken= Guardians ad litem-
Cannot consent.-Testimony in a suit in chancery appeared to have been
taken by a person without any appointment of record for the purpose.
Hel, lie had po power to take it, and, as against an infant defendant, it
was rejected : Fischer v. Fischer, 54 Ills.
An infant defendant in chancery cannot consent, nor can his guardian
ad litem fbr him, to the taking of testimony before a person not properly
authorized to take it. A guardian ad litern cannot admit away any of
the rights of an infant or bind him by consent to an. act which may be
prejudicial to the infant: It.
A bill in chancery was filed against an infant, for the purpose of hav-
ing the title of certain land which had become vested in the infant by
inheritance from his father, who had died, declared to be held in trust
for the complainant, on the allegation that the land was purchased and
VOL. XX.-9
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paid for by complainant, but by the procurement of third persons, was
conveyed to the father of the infant defendant, without the knowledge
or consent of the grantee or of the complainant. .eld, the complain-
ant was not a competent witness in his own behalf. ie was incompetent
at common law, and was not within any of the exceptions of the Act
of 1867 : Id.
INSURANCE. See ltighway.
Execution Debtor and Creditor.-A person having acquired title by
levy of execution on premises insured to the execution-debtor is not
entitled to tile proceeds of the policy in ease of loss by fire: Plimpton
v. Farmers' Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 43 Vt.
Semble. The mortgagee has in general no claim, either in law or
equity, upon the proceeds of a policy effected by the mortgagor in his
own name on the iortgaged premises, without any agreement to keep
the premises insured, unless the policy be assigned to him: Id.
Application- When a part of the Contrat.-Whcre a policy of insur-
ance against fire referred to the application. "for a more full and par-
ticular description and forming a part of this policy," and declared that
the policy was made and accepted in reference to the terms and con-
ditions therein contained and thereto annexed, which were declared
to be a part of the contract: Held, that by force of such reference, the
application was made a part of the contract: Shoemaker v. Glens Falls
Ins. Co., 60 Barb.
JurY.
Criminal Law-Bystander communicating with a Juror daring a
Trial.-The mere fact that a bystander hands a slip of paper or speaks
to a juror, during the progress of the trial of a capital case, without
reference to the character of the communication, and without miscon-
duct oin the part of the juror, cannot be regarded as ground for a new
trial, on the theory that the juror's mind was thereby diverted from the
ease: Martin v. People, 54 Ills.
So where a bystander, during the progress of a trial of a party on the
charge of murder, handed to one of the jurors five dollars which he owed
him, and for no other purpose than the payment of the debt, it was held,
while there was an impropriety in approaching a juror for any purpose,
under such circumstances, without first obtaining the leave of the court
and the consent of the parties, yet, as the transaction was entirely inno-
cent in its character, and no harm to the prisoner resulted, it was not
ground for a new trial: Id. "
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF. See'Pleading.
MORTGAGE. See Usury.
Married Woman-Acts of Husband- Collateral Securitl.-A mort-
gage that has been satisfied and delivered up to the mortgagee without
being cancelled, may be again delivered as a valid security by the mort-
gagor, and such new delivery gives it new vitality against the mortgagor,
but not as against intervening encumbrancers: Underhill v. Atwater, 7
C. E. Green.
The mortgage of a married woman given as collateral security for the
debts contracted by the brother of her husband in continuing and pre-
serving the former business of her husband for his benefit, is satisfied
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and discharged by the release of the brother from such debts. It cannot
be pledged by her husband for another purpose without her autho-
rity: Id.
But when the brother was discharged from his debts on condition
that the assets of the business should be assigned by him in payment of
them, and that the creditor should retain the mortgage as security for
the payment of the debts so assigned, such retention of the mortgage is
for the purpose for which it was given-collateral security for the debts
of the husband's brother, and the husband would have power to con-
tinue the mortgage for that purpose without further consent of his wife,
were it not that by this arrangement she could no longer call upon the
brother for whom alone she was surety: Id.
Although no express power is given to use or pledge a mortgage for
a particular purpose, such power may be inferred from the circumstances
of the case, the situation of the parties, and the general object for which
the mortgage was given: Ad.
A complainant to whom a mortgage has been assigned as security for
a specific debt can only have a decree for that debt., although pending
the foreclosure suit, the whole mortgage is absolutely assigned to him.
His remedy for the residue may be by supplemental bill or petition for
the surplus : ITd.
MuNICIPAL (ORPORATION.
Issue of Small Bills as Ourrency.-The issue of small notes by the
city of Richmond in April 1861 designed to circulate as currency, was
in violation of the then existing statutes of the state, and the notes when
issued were thus void: Thomas v. Cidy of Richmond, 12 Wall.
Neither a provision in the city charter which gave to it "all the
rights, franchises, capacities, and powers appertaining to municipal cor-
porations," nor a provision which authorized it "to contract loans and
cause to be issued certificates of debt or bonds," gave an authority to the
city to issue small notes for currency: Id.
In a community in which it is against public policy, as well as express
law, for any person or body corporate to issue small bills to circulate as
currency, it is certainly not one of the implied powers of a municipal
corporation to issue such bills: 11.
Certain acts passed March 19th 1862, and March 29th 1862, by a
body styling itself the legislature of the state of Virginia, which acts
pretended to make valid and recoverable in law the said notes so issued
by the city, did not do so; the acts having been passed by a legislature
not recognised by the United States, and in aid of the rebellion: Id.
Where a plaintiff is not inpari delicto with the defendant, actions are
sustained to recover back money or other consideration received for
obligations of the defendant, though the obligations themselves, being
against law, cannot be sued on : Id.
But, in the case of municipal and other public corporations: issuing
small bills as currency, this rule will not apply; the issuing of such bills
by such a corporation without authority is not only contrary to positive
law, but, being ultra vires is an abuse of the public franchises which
have been conferred upon it; and the receiver of the bills being charge-
able with notice of the wrong, is in par delicto with the officers, and
has no remedy, even for money had and received, against the corpora-
tion upon which he has aided in inflicting the wrong: Id.
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NUISANCE.
Rendering a Rouse Lzcomfoitable-}jlunction---P'nin cyi)cs on whi,'7
Eguityi 1rrceeds in such Cases.-Filling the air around a dwelling-house
with dense smoke and soot or cinders, or with noxious or offensive vapors
or odors, or with annoying noises, to such a degree as will render living
in the house uncomfortable to persons of ordinary sensitiveness on those
matters, is a nuisance and unlawful injury, which will be restrained by
injunction : Duncan v. _ayes, 7 0. E. Green.
If the title of the complainant is not disputed and the injury is clear,
it is not necessary that the fact of nuisance should be first established
by a verdict at law : li.
It is well settled that a court of equity will not restrain by injunction
any lawful business, or the erection of any building or works for such
business, because it is supposed or alleged that such business will be a
nuisance to a dwelling-house near it, it must be clear that the business
will be a nuisance, and that it cannot be carried on so as not to be
such: M.
Where the building or machinery is of itself no nuisance, the erection
will generally not be stopped, but the defendant allowed to go on with
it at the risk of not being permitted to use them in any way so as to
cause a nuisance : M(1.
As to the business itself, if it is not clearly shown that it will be a
nuisance in the way it is meant to be carried on, the court will not
restrain it, but will compel the complainant to wait for his protection
until it is in operation, and it can be shown without doubt, whether it
is a nuisance or not: 11.
No lawful occupation will be restrained or interfered with, unless it
will actually interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life, and it
appears beyond any reasonable doubt that it will so interfere : Id.
In a doubtful case, where the injury by prohibiting the business is
great and certain, and the injury to the complainant when it may occur
can be speedily remedied by an injunction applied for after the fact of
nuisance is ascertained by experiment, the defendant after being warned
of the peril, will, in general, be allowed to proceed at his own risk, until
the complainant is actually injured : i.
That the business proposed to be carried on by the defendant would
injure the prestige of the complainant's house, make it less desirable for
the better class of boarders who frequent it, and thus lessen her profits,
is no good ground for an injunction: Li.
Increased risk from fire, and the consequent large rates of insurance,
are no ground for injunction : Id.
PARTITION. See Tenant in Common.
Suit in Equity for Accounting-Construction of Will.-On partition
in equity, the court will order an accounting, and dispose of all ques-
tions arising between the parties in relation to the land and its use;
and afford complete relief: Scott et al. v. Guernsey et al : 60 Barb.
Where the title of the parties depends upon the construction to be
given to a will, and the defendants are in possession, claiming that by
the will they are entitled to exclusive possession, and they deny the
plaintiff's right. an action for a construction of the will, for a partition,
and for an accounting will lie; and the court will not require the plain-
tiffs to first try the question of title in an action of ejeetment: d.
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PLEADING.
Linitations-'hether pleadable.-A remote grantee of lands filed a
bill in chancery to establish a lost deed in his chain of title. The widow
and heirs of the grantee in the lost deed, being made parties defendant,
set up, as a defence to the relief sought, the Statute of Limitations bar-
ring a right of entry, claiming title in themselves : Held, the Statute of
Limitations thus set up was not an appropriate defence as against the
relief sought by the bill-the establishment of the lost deed. Indeed,
as the defendants claimed under that deed, the relief sought was not
adverse to them: Rockwell et al. v. Servant et ux., 54 Ills.
PuBLIC OFricER. See Governor.
REPLEVIN.
Execution-Bankruptcy of Debtor.-The defendant in an execution,
whose property, not exempt, from seizure under execution, has been levied
upon under an execution, regular upon its face, and issued by proper
authority, and executed by the officer to whom it is directed, cannot
recover the possession of such property by an action in the nature of
replevin, for the immediate possession thereof; even though he may,
after the rendition of the judgment and before the issue of the execu-




Officer-Trustee 1'rocess.-Where a constable bid in a horse which
he was selling on execution, and accounted for the proceeds to the exe-
cution-creditor, neither the debtor nor creditor objecting, but being
satisfied with the price, and the constable then sold it to H., the debtor
acquiescing in the sale, and there being nothing in the transaction
fraudulent as to creditors, it was held that the sale to H. was good, and
transferred the title ; and that neither the constable nor H. were charge-
able as trustees in a suit against the debtor in favor of another creditor:
Farnur v. Perry, 43 Vt. SLANDER.
Actionable Words-Evidence.-In slander the words laid and proved
were, the plaintiff "had stolen corn out of Gribble's field." The defend-
ant's point was "that if the jury believe the defendant spoke, and the
bystanders understood him as referring to standing corn, the plaintiff
could not recover." Held, that the point should have been affirmed:
Stitzell v. Reynolds and Wife, 67 Pa.
Calling one a thief for stealing a tree or other thing adhering to the
freehold is riot actionable: Id.
Charging one with wilfully taking fruit, &c., which is made by Act of
Assembly a misdemeanor, is not actionable: Id.
To constitute slander the words spoken must inilpute an offence both
indictable and infamous: Id.
Conduct and words of the defendant after suit brought should not be
submitted to the jury as an element in assessing dainages: .
Such evidence was proper in determining the question of malice with
which the words charged had been spoken: Id.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
TAXATION. See Constitutional Law.
TENANT IN 0OoMIION.
Trespass on the Case-Agueduct-Spring- Muer.-An action on
the case sounding in tort may be maintained by one tenant in common
against his co-tenant for a misuse of the common property, though not
amounting to a total destruction of it : iMcLellan v. Jenness, 43 Vt.
The plaintiff and defendant and three others owned a main aqueduct,
each having the right to one-fifth the water passing therein, which they
took to their respective premises by branch aqueducts which each owned
separately. The plaintiff sued the defendant in trespass on the case for
a misuse of the water to the injury of the plaintiff. The court charged
the jury that if they found that the defendant wilfully and knowingly
used or wasted more than his one-fifth part of the water which came in
the main aqueduct, or knowingly suffered hisfarmill to do it, for the pur-
pose of annoying or injuring the plaintiff, or with a wanton disregard or
indifference to the inconvenience it might occasion to the plaintiff, and
thereby the plaintiff suffered injury, then the defendant is liable in this
action. IHeld that this was correct: Id.
Partition-R'nts.-Bill for an account of rents, and for partition of
a strip 50 feet long by 5 feet wide, being the rear boundary line of the
lots of complainant and defendant. Decree that each party is entitled
to the half of the strip which adjoins his own premises, and if the parties
are agreed as to the direction of the line, division will be ordered to be
made by a line drawn through the middle of the strip, parallel to and
equally distant from the sides, without the delay or. expense of appoint-
ing commissioners: Davidson v. Thompson, 7 0. . Green.
A tenant in common is not, in general, accountable to his co-tenant
for rents. But when he takes possession of the premises, and excludes
his co-tenant and takes the rent therefor, he must account for the rents,
deducting expenses for repairs and taxes : Id.
One entitled in remainder as co-tenant during the life estate, by per-
mission of, and agreement with, the life tenant, erected buildings on the
common property, and received rents for the same before and after the
termination of the life estate. .dld that on partition he could not hold
the builhings or their value, and must account for the rents received after
the death of the life tenant: Scott et al. v. Guernsey, et al., 60 Barb.
Nor will equity support such a claim, where the tenant has, by the
rents received during the life estate, been fully reimbursed for all his
expenditures and interest: Id.
One tenant in common in possession of the common property, is liable
to pay rent only when he agrees to pay it; and-such an agreement only
enurcs to the benefit of the co-tenant with whom it is made. Nor can
he set off against such rent the cost of improvements and additions, not
strictly repairs : d.
A tenant in common occupying without agreement to pay rent is not
liable, on partition, to account for rent, even though the occupancy be
by a firm of which the tenant in common is a partner: P(.
A tenant in common receiving rents is liable to pay interest on the
sums so received without a previous demand : Id.
The rent so received is a lien on the shares of the parties receiving
it, in fivor of the parties to whom it is due. -1d.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
TENDER. See T'endor.
At what Time it mna be inade.-A debtor may, even after suit is
brought, and at any time before the trial, make a sufficient tender and
relieve himself from future costs: ,Sweetland v. Tltlill, 54 Ills.
But in such a ease, he should tender a sum sufficient to cover all that
the creditor then has a right to recover, whether of debt, interest, or
costs, and if lie tenders less, the tender is not good, and the plaintiff
would be entitled to recover costs: Id.
A debtor tendered his creditor a certain sum as the amount due, which,
being refused, was deposited in court. Upon a trial by jury, a verdict
was rendered for a less sum, when the court ordered the residue to be
refunded to the defendant: .tIeld, this was error, the defendant having,
by tendering the sum, admitted it was due: Id.
USURY.
Interest-Agency.-A sale of mortgage securities at a premium cannot
subject the party to an action to recover back the premium on the ground
of usury: uzlver v. Bigelow, 43 Vt.
Although courts rarely, if ever, as between debtor and creditor, en-
force an executory contract for the payment of compound interest, yet
the payment of it is not necessarily in a legal sense the payment of
usury; and if a debtor knowingly, understandingly, and unconditionally
pays it under no peculiar circumstances of oppression, it cannot be
recovered back : -d.
Where a party by simple contract deals with an agent who does not
disclose the tact of his agency, lie may be made liable in a suit in the
nane of the principal to the same extent as if the agent had been prin-
cipal and the suit had been brought in his name : Id.
But w here aii agent of a party holden on a note and mortgage purchases
the same for his principal, taking an assignment to himself" instead of a
discharge, and pays more than annual interest, and the agency is not
known to the creditor, but lie supposes the agent purchased iii his own
behalf; the liability of the creditor for the excess paid is not different
friom what it would have been if the transaction was in fhct what it
apparently was, a purchase by the agent in his own behalf: _d.
If the agency was known to the creditor, the form of the transaction,
being a sale and transfbr to the agent, would not vary the creditor's lia-
bility to the principal for the usury from what it would have been if it
had been a payment by the principal : Id.
There being testimony tending to show notice of the agency to the
creditor or his attorney, the question of notice should have been sub-
mitted to the jury in an action by the principal to recover back the
excess : d.
VENDOR AND VENDEE.
Eu'forcing l-erformance- Tener-Rescissio.-Irvin contracted to
buy land from ]3leakley, paid half the purchase-money down, and was
to pay the remainder in sixty days, when the deed was to be delivered.
The money was not paid or demanded at the end of sixty days nor deed
tendered. After that the time for performance became indefinite, but
mutual and dependent whenever it should occur : Irvin v. Bleakley,
67 Pa.
